Luthfi Assyaukanie: "To be on the safe side, don’t use Islamic issues"
Source: Tempo, No. 10/VIII/November 06-12, 2007
Since it was first introduced by Nurcholish Madjid back in the early 1970s, the term “secularization” has become a topic of hot debate among Muslims in Indonesia. Today, Luthfi Assyaukanie says that Indonesian Muslims are more open and have a positive attitude towards political secularization. Luthfi made the conclusion in his doctoral dissertation, which he completed a year ago at Melbourne University. Attention is now being focused on the dissertation since it was named one of four dissertations to have received the Chancellor’s Prize, two weeks ago. Luthfi becomes the first foreign student to receive the award.
Luthfi’s research focused on three generations of Muslims in Indonesia, using the 1955, 1999 and 2004 general elections as the dividing periods. He discovered that besides the role of the state, it was the late Nurcholish Madjid who changed the general view of Muslims that fighting for universal values of Islam could be done without going through Islamic parties.
Like Nurcholish, Luthfi also came from a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) background and later pursued a Western education. He is now completing his dissertation at Nanyang Technology University in Singapore so he can publish it in a book. Two weeks ago, Luthfi, Coordinator of the Liberal Islamic Network, met with Tempo journalists Nugroho Dewanto, Idrus F. Shahab and Ig. Widi Nugroho for an interview. Excerpts:
After the Nurcholish Madjid era, what is new about Islam and secularization in your dissertation?
There has been a change in the thought patterns of Indonesian Muslims. During the 1950s, almost all Muslims having a santri (devout Muslims) and religious concept would certainly support the concept of an ideological Islamic state. Today, they no longer think in that way.
What tools did you use to measure changes that took place?
We can see the differences between the general elections of 1955, 1999 and 2004. In 1955, a number of Islamic political parties banded together to support the concept and the ideology of an Islamic state, the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the opening of the 1945 Constitution and the official implementation of Shari’a. The group consisted of the Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, the Indonesian Islamic Social Party (PSII) and others. They obtained 13 percent of the votes. Almost all Islamic figures were dominated by conservative Islamic political thought, including ‘modernists’ like Pak Roem, Pak Syafrudin and Pak Natsir.
Why was there no comparison with elections during the New Order era?
That’s because elections during that time were not democratic. There were no Islamic parties that really fought for Islamic ideology, so strong was the state.
So what happened in elections during the reform era?
The Islamic parties were back promoting their ideologies just like in 1955. The results of the 1999 elections indicated that the voice of Islam, represented by the United Development Party (PPP), Crescent Star Party (PBB), Justice Party (PK) and others only obtained 14 percent of the votes. In 2004, the votes increased to 17 percent, mostly won by the Justice & Prosperity Party (PKS) which used to be the PK. Yet the increase should be explained again and again in the framework of secularization in Islamic political thought in Indonesia.
What do you mean?
When PKS was still the PK, it only won a small percentage of the votes in the 1999 elections. They failed to make the electoral threshold and because of it had to change its name and its logo. Not only that. From the files, I note that before the 2004 elections, the party changed its strategy and tactics so they won more votes.
In what way?
Try comparing their campaigns during the 1999 and 2004 elections. In 1999, the Islam ideology going around was really thick. Their main agenda included Islamic Shari’a, the Jakarta Charter and others. Towards the 2004 elections, PKS leaders like Hidayat Nurwahid warned their members to be careful about using Islamic symbols in public. Hence their agenda during the campaigns was clean government and anti-corruption. The instance you use Islamic issues, you will fail. That’s what happened and this is very interesting.
Why are Indonesians, the majority of whom are Muslims, unwilling to accept a formalized Islam?
The argument is that Islam can be fought for without it being formalized. The slogan cited by Nurcholish Madjid: Islam Yes, Islamic Party No, continued to spread among Islamic groups. There was a kind of a huge campaign to convince people that it was alright not to back Islamic parties. Eventually, after 30 years, they started to think that maybe there would be no problem if they voted for secular parties. So a process of secularization has been taking place, distancing Muslims’ way of thinking from Islamic ideology.
So, substantially, PKS has not changed? Didn’t their leaders say they were not endorsing the Jakarta Charter but the Medina Charter?
Yes, they no longer want to compete on ideological issues because they are sure to lose. When in 2002, a special People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) session held a vote to include the Jakarta Charter [in the Constitution], the PKS refused to go with the PPP and the PBB on this. They only mentioned the Medina Charter so that they would not be accused of supporting the secular national groups.
Today, Muslims don’t seem to be too reluctant about discussing democracy and pluralism?
In the 1950s, discussions on democracy, pluralism and secularism were the domain of the secular nationalists. Muslims were not too concerned about the issue. Then, Nurcholish confidently stated that concepts normally discussed by the nationalists were, in fact, very Islamic. Groups like Paramadina are quite familiar with the issues and have become the initiators of such topics.
So these new devout Muslims are merely superficial Islamic elites?
At the people’s level there is today some kind of Islamization, but quietly they can accept secular politics applied by the state and promoted by the new, reform-minded Muslims. Since the 19th century, Muslim reformists in general had the same agenda as the government and Western countries, and that is modernization, progress, democracy and pluralism. That is why the Muslim reformists are criticized as being lackeys of the government and the West.
So, even though many women have taken up wearing headscarves, it doesn’t mean they accept the idea of an Islamic state.
Correct.
But we really don’t know the extent of their conviction. Aren’t they easily swayed and likely to vote for an Islamic party at the appropriate time?
It’s difficult to say because conceptually political Islam cannot be sustained. Discussions on Islamic political thought are developing. At the start of the 1920s, almost no Muslims dared to refute the idea of the caliphate. One ulama (religious leader) who dared to challenge it was Ali Abdul Razik. He was even tried by other ulama of Al-Azhar. When Razik entered the courtroom and greeting those present, no ulama returned his greeting because he was considered a kafir (a non-believer). But 70 years later, no Muslim country wanted to be a caliphate, only groups like the Hizbut Tahrir.
So, is there a synthesis in Islamic political thinking?
Synthesis cannot be avoided. After the caliphate idea, the concept of an Islamic state emerged, which actually came from the concept of a nation-state. The first person to introduce this concept was Rasyid Ridha. This objective was to be a bridge. If we cannot accept a neutral concept of the nation-state, well, we can always use the Islamic state concept. In fact, the term Islamic state in itself is conceptually defective.
Where is the defect?
When we speak from the democratic perspective, that is not really democratic. There is a kind of discrimination because citizens must be Muslims if they are to be leaders. From this alone we can see that the idea of an Islamic state can never develop.
How do you explain the emergence of groups like the Al-Qiyadah?
The emergence of these ‘fragmented’ groups is actually normal within Islam. At the beginning of the history of Islam, there were hundreds of these sects, both in the theological as well as in the legal sense. Before the 10th century, these kinds of sects prospered without restriction from any institution or religious authority. All sects were able to exist, interact and exchange views during scientific debates. But after the Sunni sect dominated, other theological sects were challenged. Sunni ulama like Al-Juwaini and Al-Ghazali created a theological formula which essentially considered sects that did not conform with Sunni beliefs to have lost their ways.
So how should these fragmented sects and ‘new prophets’ that keep emerging be treated?
According to Islamic doctrine, Mohammad was the last prophet. To believers of other faiths, their prophets are the last. So, such claims should not be an issue. If a person claims he has received divine revelation and claims to be a prophet, why should it bother us? I believe nature will take its course on those religious streams or groups. If they can offer something that is acceptable to men, they will survive. Otherwise, they will vanish on their own. n
Luthfi Assyaukanie
Education
- 2006 PhD Melbourne University, Australia
- 2003 MA Melbourne University, Australia
- 1995 MA Islamic International University, Malaysia
- 1993 BA University of Jordan, Jordan
Career
- Research Associate, Freedom Institute, Jakarta (2006-to date)
- Coordinator, Liberal Islam Network (JIL), Jakarta (2006-to date)
- Lecturer in Philosophy and Religion, Paramadina University, Jakarta (2000-to date)
- Lecturer in Islamic Studies, Al-Azhar University, Jakarta (1999-2000)
- Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Indonesia, Jakarta (1996-1998)
- Science Editor, Ummat magazine, Jakarta (1995-1999)
